

2006 USAF Aircraft Structural Integrity Program Conference

C-130 Center Wing MSD/MED Risk Analysis

***P. Christiansen, WR/ALC
G.R. Bateman, LM Aero
A. Navarrete, LM Aero***

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Overview

- **Background**
- **Analysis Locations**
- **MSD/MED Risk Analysis of the Lower Surface Panel**
- **MSD Risk Analysis of the Wing Joint Fitting**
- **Structural Integrity Management Strategies**
- **Conclusions and Lessons Learned**



Background




- **1995-2000** Service Life Analysis (SLA) projected fatigue cracking occurrence rates:
 - *Cumulative Fatigue Damage Methodology*
 - *Full Scale Durability Test Results used to estimate the mean time to cracking and determine K_t*
 - *Fatigue Test relative severity to the C-130E Baseline Usage determined to be 3.3*
- **2001-2004** Inspections identified numerous USAF C-130E/H Center Wings with significant fatigue cracking
 - *123 aircraft found with cracks at FCL's*
 - *Service cracking occurring earlier than projected based on SLA*
 - *Prevalence of Multi-Site Damage (MSD) & Multi-Element Damage (MED)*
 - *Service Crack Correlation analysis determined Fatigue Test relative severity to the C-130E Baseline Usage is 2.0*




- **2004** USAF Center Wing Service Life Independent Review Team (IRT) Formed:
 - *Lead by Dr. Gallagher*
 - *To validate C-130 Service Life*
 - *To provide guidance on determining Risk*
 - *Focused on 3 Center Wing Zones*
 - *Concern over un-inspected area (95% of lower surface)*
- **2005** Risk Analysis Performed:
 - *Discrete Source Damage – a severed skin panel with cracked stringers*
 - *Fatigue Crack Propagating across an intact panel*
 - *Results presented at 2005 ASIP Conference*
 - *Concluded that a Single Panel Failure must be prevented*

Background C-130 Center Wing Box





Center Wing Section View (Typical)








Analysis Locations



Zone 1 (WS 61):

- Wing to Fuselage Attachment
- Susceptible to MSD and MED
- Difficult to Inspect (requires Bolt Hole Eddy Current) approx 300 Fasteners
- Jan '05 - 44 USAF A/C found with in-service cracking
 - Current total – 102 Cracks on 71 A/C
- Longest Service Cracks Discovered:
 - USAF 2.0 in.
 - Commercial 12.0 in.
- Critical Crack Size at Design Limit Stress = 6.5 in.





Lower Surface Aft Panel

Stringer No. 24

WS 61 Rib

WS 61



Wing Attach Angle

Rear Beam Lower Cap



- **12 inch Fatigue Crack on L382 Commercial Aircraft:**


- MSD and MED
- 2 Internal Stringers also cracked at this location

View Looking Up on Center Wing Lower Surface

Panel No. 2

MSD Link-up

Panel No. 1



Wing Attach Angle Removed

WS 58

WS 61

Fuselage Side Wall Panel


This Wing Could Not Sustain Design Limit Load



Stringer 17

Zone 1 MSD and MED Cracking
Skin Panel No. 2



Stringer 16






Zone 2 (WS 178):

- Engine Nacelle Attachment to the Wing (WS 213 Similar)
- Requires Bolt Hole Eddy Current Inspection of approx 160 Fastener Holes
- Location of Center Wing Residual Strength Test MSD/MED Failure
- 28 A/C found with in-service MSD/MED cracking:
 - *Front Beam Cap*
 - *Skin Panel*
 - *Stringer*





WS 178

Nacelle Attach Fitting


Drain Trough

Lower Surface
Fwd Panel

Front Beam
Lower Cap

Stringer No. 12



WS 178 Rib






Zone 3 (WS 220):

- Center Wing to Outer Wing Production Joint
- Wing Joint Fitting has 13 “Nodes”:
 - Prone to MSD Cracking
 - Short “critical” crack length (0.07 in.)
- 35 A/C documented with in-service MSD/MED cracking:
 - Multiple Node Cracks
 - Adjacent Panel Cracks
- Three adjacent Node cracks reduce strength to below Design Limit






Wing Joint Fitting

Lower Surface Panel

Stringer



WS 220



Typical Panel Crack

Typical Fitting Crack

Forward Corner Fitting




Crack Initiation at Node Bolt Hole Counterbore





Typical Node Crack Fracture Surface






**MSD/MED Risk Analysis
Zone 1 & 2 - Lower Surface Panels**



- **Test and In-Service Cracking has shown that Zones 1 and 2 experience both MSD and MED Cracking that affect Residual Strength:**
 - ***“Standard” Crack Growth Analysis with Continuing Damage does not adequately model the cracking behavior***
 - ***Single Flight Probability of Failure (SFPoF) is underestimated by the single dominant fatigue crack scenario***
 - ***Discrete Source Damage Risk Analysis (presented at 2005 ASIP Conference) showed that the Risk is unacceptable should a single skin panel fail due to undetected MSD cracking***




Stress Occurrences




Single Flight


Probability of Failure




EIFS Distributions



Residual Strength



Crack Growth Rates




Single Dominant Crack Scenario




- **LM Aero MSD Crack Growth Analysis Program:**
 - *Runs from 0 EBH to EBH at MSD Crack “Link-up”*
 - *Random application of EIFS at multiple locations*
 - *Analytically grows MSD Cracks (Includes stress intensity interaction effects)*
 - *Non-Destructive Inspections (NDI) Probabilistic Detection:*
 - “Reset” of discovered cracks to random EIFS following inspection and repair
 - *Records the MSD maximum crack size at regular intervals of EBH*
 - *Provides a probabilistic solution to determine time to MSD “link-up” via a Monte-Carlo Simulation*
 - Simulation is repeated 100,000 times to obtain statistical results
 - The probability distribution of MSD Crack Sizes as a function of EBH




Crack Growth Rates




EIFS Distributions




Probability of Detection



MSD Crack Growth Program



MSD Crack Probability




MSD Crack Scenario






**MSD Max Crack Size Probability Distribution
Zone 1 - Lower Surface Panel at WS 61**



- Results of MSD Crack Growth Analysis
- Determines the probability of a MSD Crack of a given size in increments of approx 350 EBH
- Probability Distributions determined for No Inspection and Including Inspection



**MSD Crack Probability vs EBH Distribution
Zone 1- Lower Surface Panel at WS 61**




- Results of MSD Crack Growth Program
- Probabilities of a given crack size vs EBH
- Probability of MSD Link-up rises rapidly beyond 40,000 EBH without inspection




- **Single Flight Probability of Failure Risk Analysis Methodology:**
 - ***For each increment of EBH:***
 - Numerical Integration of Max Stress Probability of Exceedance Curve
 - Max Stress “Layer” value interpolated on Residual Strength Curve to determine Crack Length to cause Fracture (a_{CR})
 - Crack Length a_{CR} value interpolated on MSD Crack Probability Distribution at the given EBH
 - SFPoF is Numerical Product of Probability of Max Stress and Probability of MSD Crack Present
 - Repeat process for all “Layers” of Max stress to the once per flight stress level
 - ***Repeat process for all increments of EBH***




Residual Strength




Stress Occurrence Probability



MSD Crack Probability



Single Flight Probability of Failure CW-1 Lower Surface Panel at WS 61





- **Conclusions of the Lower Surface Panel Risk Analysis:**
 - *MSD Cracking Scenario results in higher Risk probabilities than the single dominant fatigue crack*
 - *Mitigation by inspection is possible, but much uncertainty remains in the Probability of Detection (POD) and Probability of Inspection (POI) due to the large number of fastener holes requiring inspection*
 - *Previous discrete source damage analysis has shown that the Probability of Failure is unacceptable should a single panel fail at 35,000 EBH or higher*

Risk Mitigation Strategy Must Ensure A Panel Failure Does Not Occur





**MSD/MED Risk Analysis
Zone 3 - Lower Wing Joint Fitting**




- **Test and Service Cracking Data Show that the Wing Joint Fitting Area Experiences MSD/MED Cracking:**
 - ***“Standard” Slow Crack Growth DTA Methodology cannot be applied to determine inspection intervals:***
 - Critical crack length is less than detectable ($a_{CR} < a_{NDI}$)
 - Once per flight max stress “critical” crack size approx 0.5 in.
 - ***Is a single part, with crack arrest features***
 - ***Fitting consists of 13 similar details at similar stress levels where cracking initiates***
 - ***Also, adjacent skin panel (MED) cracking at the fitting outer tang attachment***

How Do we Analyze This?





Wing Joint Area FEM





Ribs and Upper Surface Not Shown



Comparison of Fitting Failure Mode on Stresses in Rainbow Fitting Lower Tang



Rainbow Fitting Lower Tang





- **Conclusions of Finite Element Model Analysis:**
 - *“Critical” Crack Length in Node is short (0.07 in.)*
 - *Crack arrests up vertical face between nodes at 2.5 in.*
 - *No effect on Bolt Load Distributions until the fatigue crack fractures across the Node (i.e. is 2.5 in. in length)*
 - *At Design Limit Load, Structure can tolerate:*
 - up to 2 adjacent Nodes fractured
 - up to 5 Nodes fractured, as long as none are adjacent

***Presence of adjacent Skin cracks do not affect
Wing Joint Fitting Residual Strength***




- **Wing Joint Fitting MSD Crack Growth Program:**
 - *Runs from 0 EBH to “T” EBH when all Nodes have Fractured*
 - *Random application of EIFS at each Node location*
 - *Analytically grows MSD Cracks (interaction when node fractures)*
 - *Non-Destructive Inspections (NDI) Probabilistic Detection:*
 - Only fractured nodes can be detected (i.e. 2.5 in. crack)
 - Fitting is “replaced” when one or more node fracture is detected
 - *Records the Number of Fractured Nodes (adjacent and not-adjacent) at each increment of EBH*
 - *Provides a probabilistic solution to determine time to “n” fractured Nodes via a Monte-Carlo Simulation*
 - Simulation is repeated 5,000 times to obtain statistical results
- The Probability Distribution of “n” number of fractured Nodes
as a function of EBH***




- **Single Flight Probability of Failure (SFPoF) MSD Risk Analysis Methodology:**
 - ***Similar to the Wing Panel MSD Risk Analysis***
 - ***For each increment of EBH:***
 - Numerical Integration of Max Stress Probability of Exceedance Curve
 - Max Stress “Layer” value interpolated on Residual Strength Curve to determine “n” Number of Fractured (Adjacent and Non-Adjacent) Nodes
 - Number of Fractured Nodes interpolated on MSD Cracking Probability Distribution at the given EBH
 - SFPoF is Numerical Product of Probability of Max Stress and Probability of “n” Number of Fractured Nodes
 - Repeat process for all “Layers” of Max stress to the once per flight stress level
 - ***Repeat process for all increments of EBH***




MSD Crack Growth Analysis




Probability of "n" nodes fractured as a function of EBH




Stress Occurrences




Residual Strength



MSD Risk Analysis







- **Conclusions of Wing Joint Fitting Risk Analysis:**
 - *Substantial increase in SFPoF when one node fractures*
 - *Risk is **Unacceptable** if two adjacent nodes fracture*
 - *Risk can be Mitigated by continued Inspection, but replacement before 25,000 EBH is the preferred option:*
 - Short Inspection Interval Required beyond 24,000 EBH raises concern for NDI complacency
 - 20% Probability of at least one node fractured at 24,000 EBH

Risk Mitigation Strategy Must Include Inspection and Replacement



Structural Integrity Risk Management Strategies



- Numerous Risk Mitigation Strategies have been employed by the USAF C-130 ASIP Manager:
 - *Operational Flight Restrictions Imposed on USAF aircraft at **38,000 EBH** to reduce maximum wing up-bending load to below 60% of Design Limit*
 - *TCTOs released to inspect for fatigue cracking in wing joint fitting*
 - *Wing Joint Fitting Replacements at PDM*
 - *TCTO released to inspect for generalized cracking of Lower Surface of Center Wings with > 38,000 EBH*
 - *Established Service Life Limit of **45,000 EBH** - grounding of high time C-130 aircraft*
- Additional Actions Underway:
 - *Teardown Inspections*
 - *Redesign of Wing Joint Fittings*



- For non-USAF operators, LM Aero has released two major Service Bulletins:
 - **82-788/382-57-84** *Operational Usage Evaluation and Service Life Assessment*
 - **82-790/382-57-85** *Lower Surface Generalized Cracking and Widespread Fatigue Damage Inspection Requirements*
- LM Aero is assessing the need to recommend an Operating Limit for the Center Wing:
 - *FAA Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) issued in April 2006 to establish Operating Limits to prevent Widespread Fatigue Damage*
 - LM Aero has commented on this NPRM and concurs with the need for Operating Limits



Conclusions and Lessons Learned



- **USAF C-130E/H Center Wings have experienced significant fatigue cracking characterized by MSD and MED**
- **Advanced analytical techniques are required to evaluate the crack propagation rates and residual strength of structure with MSD/MED cracking**
- **Uncertainty in NDI capability (POD and POI) is significantly reducing the risk mitigation benefit of continued inspection:**
 - ***Resulted in 2 USAF C-130E Outer Wing Failures in the 1980's prior to Outer Wing Replacement***

INSPECTIONS CANNOT PROTECT SAFETY AFTER ON-SET OF WFD