# OKLAHOMA CITY AIR LOGISTICS CENTER

TEAM TINKER



Risk Identification and Mitigation

Manual Surface Eddy Current on Aircraft




David Campbell
OC-ALC NDI Program Manager



#### **Process Flow Map**



Manual Surface Eddy Current on Aircraft







Manual Surface Eddy Current on Aircraft

36	Microso	oft Excel - ORM Manu	ual Surface Eddy Current on Aircraft.xl	s															
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	C32		spector skip some of the inspection area ?																
	Α	В	С	D	Е	F	G	Н	AG	АН	Al /	AJ A	AK A	LΑ	MAN	V AC	AP	AQ	
1		OPERATIONAL RISK	MANAGEMENT WORKSHEET																
2		Manual Surface Eddy	Current on Aircraft																
3	Actions:										(plac	$\overline{}$			ate c	olum	<del> </del>		Step 3
4	-	Action 1	Action 2	Acti	ion 3	}			Act	ion 1			4 <i>ctioi</i>				1 ,	(auto)	Action 1
5	-			P	001	· C	2116	se	c	E\/E	RIT		PR				ssm	ent RISK	
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							Management		CATASTROPHI	$ $	쁴	NEGLIGIBLE	뇌	CINELY	§ _	>-			
		Operational Analysis			hine	<u>.c</u>	agei	. <u>e</u>	٩ST	5	8	의	띍:	֓֞֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓					
8	Seq	/ Tasks	Hazard	Man	Machine	Media	Man	Mission	AT.	CRITICAL	MODERATE	의	FREQUENT	LIKELY	SEI DOM	UNLIKELY	/alue	RISK RATING	Control Measures
9	1	Job is called in	1a. Is an inspector available ?	_	_	_	_	_		Ŭ	-	1	<u>-   .</u>	-	,	+-	-	Low	
			1b. Is inspector trained and certified for this									Ť							
10			inspection?							1						1	15	Low	
		Job is assigned to an																	
11	2	inspector	2a. Is the WCD complete and accurate?								1				1		10	Med	
		Inspector gets	3a. Is technical data complete and																
12	3	technical data	accurate?								1		_	_	1	-	10	Med	
	۱,	Inspector checks out	4. La tha raguirad aguipmant augilabla 0														١		
13	4	equipment	4a. Is the required equipment available?  4b. Is the equipment serviceable, all PMEL								1	+	_	-	<u> </u>		14	Low	
14			certs up to date, etc?								1			1			10	Med	
15			4c. Are the batteries charged ?								-	1		-	1	+		Low	
15			4d. Are the probes and cables in good											+	1	+	10	LOW	
16			condition?								1			1			10	Med	
		Inspector goes to												Τ,					
17	5	aircraft	5a. Is transportation available ?									1		1			18	Low	
		Inspector gains																	
		access to the	6a. Does the inspector have all necessary																
18	6	inspection area	PPE?						1							1	12	Med	
			6b. Are the necessary stands, scissor lifts,																





			Probability							
			Frequent	Likely	Occasional	Seldom	Unlikely			
			A	В	C	D	E			
SE	Catastrophic	I	1	2	6	8	12			
VE	Critical	II	3	4	7	11	15			
R I	Moderate	III	5	9	10	14	16			
Y	Negligible	IV	13	17	18	19	20			
					Risk Level	S				





	А	В	С	D	Е
1	Occurance Probability	Definitions	- Compiled from AFPAM	90-902 and MIL-STD	-882D
2					
3	Description	Level	Specific Individual Item	Fleet or Inventory	
	Frequent	Α	Likely to occur often in	Continously	
			the life of an item, with a	experienced.	
			probability of occurance		
			greater than 1 in that		
4			life.	) A CH	
	Likely / Probable	В	Will occur several times	Will occur	
			in the life of an item,	frequently.	
			with a probability of occurrence less than 1		
_			but greater than 0.1 in that life.		
5	Occasional	С	Likely to occur some	Will occur several	
	Occasional		Itime in the life of an	Itimes.	
			item, with a probability	lumes.	
			of occurance less than		
			0.1but greater than 0.01		
6			in that life.		
	Remote / Seldom	D	Unlikely but possible to	Unlikely, but can	
		_	occur in the life of an	reasonably be	
			item, with a probability	expected to occur.	
			of occurrence less than		
			0.01 but greater than		
7			0.00001 in that life.		
	Unlikely / Improbable	Е	So unlikely, it can be	Unlikey to occur,	
			assumed occurrence	but possible.	
			may not be		
			experienced, with a		
			probability of		
			occurrence less than		
. 8			0.0001 in that life.		





SEVERITY	Catastrophic	Critical	Moderate	Negligible	Source
Mission	Complete mission	Major mission	Minor mission	Less than minor	AFPAM 90-
	failure	degradation	degradation	mission	902
			P 100 - 0.0	degradation	
People	Death	Severe injury,	Minor injury,	Less than minor	AFPAM 90-
		occupational	Minor	injury,	902
		illness	occupational	occupational	
ri		65)	illness	illness	35
Mishap Class	Class A mishap	Class B mishap	Class C mishap		ORM Level
					1 Course
Mishap Cost	> \$1,000,000	> \$200,000	> \$10,000	<\$10,000	ORM Level
30.771 N3	201 = 5 18	\$1 2	200	200	1 Course
Systems	Loss of system	Major system	Minor system	Less than minor	AFPAM 90-
(equipment,		damage	damage	system damage	902
facilities,					
environment)					
Budget	> 100% over	> 50% over	> 10% over	< 10% over	76th MXW
0	budget	budget	budget	budget	
Budget	> \$1,000,000	> \$200,000	> \$10,000	<\$10,000	76th MXW
Schedule	> 100% delay	> 50% delay	> 10% delay	< 10% delay	76th MXW



#### **Identified Risks**



#### Manual Surface Eddy Current on Aircraft

			Probability						
			Frequent	Likely	Occasional	Seldom	Unlikely		
			A	В	C	D	E		
S E	Catastrophic	I	1	2	6	8	12		
·	Critical	II	3	4	7	11	15		
E R I	Moderate	III	5	9	10	14	16		
$egin{array}{c} ar{\mathbf{T}} \\ \mathbf{Y} \end{array}$	Negligible	IV	13	17	18	19	20		
			Risk Levels						

#	Hazard	Risk	Control Measure(s)	Risk
1	Inadequate NDI Technical Data	4	See Action Plan	15
2	Inspector Discipline	7	See Action Plan	14
3	Inspection Difficulty - Ergonomics	7	See Action Plan	15
4	Failure of QA to Find Discrepancies	7	See Action Plan	15
5	Insufficient Level 3 Availability	9	See Action Plan	14






Hazard: Inadequate NDI Technical Data

- Almost a daily occurrence
- Problems can occur in the work control documents, process orders, statements of work, specifications, drawings, or technical orders
- While not all technical orders are completely inadequate, may contain procedures or portions of procedures that are

inadequate

 Problems range from equipment obsolescence to incorrect references, ergonomics to the inspection simply does not work, to conflicts between directives







#### Aircraft Technical Data

- Performing a procedure by procedure performance verification
- Engineering has designated equipment specialist to work TO changes

#### Commodities Technical Data

- Contract and contractors in place reviewing all commodities technical data
- Developing procedures were inadequate technical data exists

#### **Engines Technical Data**

- Level 3 availability prohibiting proactive approach
- Problems are corrected as identified





**Hazard:** Inspector Discipline







Hazard: Inspection Difficulty - Ergonomics

- There are multiple instances where the ergonomics of the inspection increases the difficulty of the inspection
- Surface eddy current on top of a wing is vastly different from inside of a wing tank holding the probe, a flashlight and a mirror
- Difficulties can include confined spaces, overhead inspection, temperature, lighting, large areas or large number of fasteners







#### **Status**

- Consider breaking up inspections to reduce monotony
  - Break an 8 hour inspection into two 4 hour inspections
- Working to reduce the inspector burden
- Conformal eddy current probes





Hazard: Failure of QA to Find Discrepancies

- Intense Unit Condition Inspection (UCI) preparation found several process problems
- QA reported no NDI failures
- Identified lack of comprehensive NDI knowledge
- Identified NDI specific training to be required and placed requirement in Quality Manual
- All Groups have now hired personnel with NDI experience







#### Hazard: Insufficient SME's in NDI

- Tinker NDI expertise has degraded over the last 13 years from 12 to 8 Level 3 certified engineers and technicians
- Initial 12 Level 3's held 42 certificates, current 8 hold 22
- This year alone we have seen three retirements and five transfers
- Continued proliferation of NDI technology and processes (laser holography, digital x-ray, automated immersion phased array ultrasonics, sonic infrared, etc)
- Lack of Level 3 SSQ Qualification Officials pulling resources from NDI process oversight
- Groups report that increasing workload, lean and transformation initiatives was already straining existing Level 3's. One Group expanding from 5 NDI shops to 13.





- 2 individuals have earned 3 ASNT certificates
- Took ASNT ultrasonic testing on October 20, 2006
- Candidates have been attending Level 3 ultrasonics and radiography classes
- Groups have identified current and future Level 3 requirements
- Begin justifying additional positions to senior leadership
- Level 3 engineering slots are among the hardest engineering positions to fill





Hazard: Inspector Discipline

Complacency was identified by ASC/EN as a potential danger

It was discussed that allowing one-self to become distracted, pushed by production pressure, or otherwise complacent was far more likely to happen than inspector integrity issues.







#### **Status**


- Morale and production pressure have been identified as major drivers
- Largest variable in the NDI process is the human element
- Working to reduce the inspector burden
- Inspectors do as much paperwork as NDI







#### **Status**

- Consider breaking up inspections to reduce monotony
  - Break an 8 hour inspection into two 4 hour inspections
  - Semi-Automated defect reporting
    - Computer form with drop down boxes, etc.
  - Conformal eddy current probes







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